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Abstract
Studies of riskless choice in both cognitive 
(Stevenson, 1986) and behavioral paradigms (Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967) have found that subjects prefer 
temporally delayed losses and temporally advanced 
gains. Analogously, studies of risky choice have found 
that subjects prefer risky losses and certain gains 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Because probability is 
conceptually identical to the inverse of delay, it was 
recently suggested that these findings were 
descriptions of the same choice process (Rachlin, 
Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986). There were two goals 
of the present investigation. The first was to 
replicate and extend, through the use of a within- 
subjects design, the finding that subjects prefer 
delayed gains and immediate losses. The second was to 
test the applicability of the prospect theory value 
function in a choice context involving temporally 
delayed financial options. Subjects showed strong 
preferences for immediate gains and delayed losses, but 
there was not support for the prospect theory value 
function in a riskless context involving temporal 
delays.
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Framing Effects in Riskless Decisions: 
Discounting of Temporally Delayed Gains and Losses
Temporal aspects of decision making have been 
understudied despite the omnipresent nature of time. 
Individuals make important decisions everyday that 
include a temporal dimension. For example, a person 
may deposit $1000 into a low interest bank account or 
choose to invest the money in a higher yield CD that 
does not mature for six months. College students may 
decide between making payments on a student loan while 
enrolled in classes or confronting an even larger debt 
after graduation. In both of the preceding examples, 
an individual was choosing between an immediate or 
delayed outcome with negligible risk; yet, behavioral 
decision theory provides no insights as to how we are 
to understand and predict these types of riskless 
choices.
This void in research on riskless choice involving 
delayed outcomes may be attributed to the lack of a 
theoretical mechanism to drive empirical 
investigations. To date, riskless decision making has 
invariably been studied with structural models? that 
is, researchers have been concerned with the structure 
of judgments rather than choice behavior per se
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(Abelson & Levi, 1985). However, a structural 
framework cannot yield a complete understanding of 
riskless choice because judgment is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for choice (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). 
Indeed, Billings and Scherer (1988) reported that a 
popular structural model, policy capturing (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1971), did not provide a good description 
of actual choice behavior.
A recent paper, however, provides a theoretical 
structure for making choice predictions in some 
riskless contexts. Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel 
(1986) suggest that the psychophysical functions stated 
in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) may apply 
to choices involving temporal delays. Although 
prospect theory is a model of risky choice, it may be 
extended to riskless choice with temporal delays 
because probability is conceptually related to delay.
In a repeated gamble, for example, an increase in the 
probability of a payoff is associated with a decrease 
in the delay to the payoff.
There is some support for a prospect theory 
explanation of riskless choice, although the three 
published investigations were all repeated gambles 
experiments conducted under the behavioral research
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paradigm (e.g., Rachlin et al., 1986). If prospect 
theory and the matching law are indeed describing the 
same choice behavior, then there should be 
correspondence between prospect theory and experiments 
on choice with delayed outcomes conducted under the 
cognitive research paradigm.
Although a few studies have been conducted under 
the cognitive paradigm favored by behavioral decision 
researchers (e.g., Stevenson, 1986), no study has 
employed a design that permits a test of prospect 
theory's value function in a riskless context with 
delayed outcomes. To date, riskless choice 
investigations have employed between-subjects designs 
with respect to outcome type. By treating outcome type 
(i.e., gain or loss) as a within-subjects variable, 
this thesis provides an empirical test of the fit of 
prospect theory's value function in a riskless decision 
context with temporal delays.
Choice with Delayed Outcomes 
Historical Perspective
The effect of temporally delayed outcomes on 
behavior was widely studied by learning researchers 
following the publication of Hull's (1932) goal 
gradient hypothesis. Hull's work was taken up by his
Discounting
6
student, Kenneth Spence, who proposed that learning 
involving delayed reinforcers occured through the 
presence of secondary reinforcers (Spence, 1947). The 
empirical work engendered by Hull (193 2) and Spence 
(1947) was plagued by its confinement to animal 
studies. Any studies that did use human subjects were 
limited to the effect of feedback delay on motor 
learning (Renner, 1964).
In the 1960's, personality researchers became 
interested in childrens' ability to delay rewards. 
Mischel and Metzner (1962) utilized psychoanalytic 
theory of personality development to predict that older 
children, having developed a reality-based secondary 
process, would be better able to delay gratification. 
Later, Mischel and Grusec (1967) utilized Rotter's 
(1954) expectancy value theory to hypothesize that 
delayed outcomes were associated with an implicit risk. 
Preferences for Delaved Outcomes
From an economic standpoint, it is always rational 
to choose more immediate gains over delayed gains 
because failure to do so represents opportunity costs 
(Yates & Watts, 1975). For example, money in the bank 
now is worth more than money in the bank a year from 
now because of the interest that may be earned. It is
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also rational, in an inflationary economy, to defer 
debt payment because the loss, represented by 
commodities foregone, decreases with time (Yates & 
Watts, 1975). Methodologically sound research within 
both personality and learning paradigms has shown that 
people (and other animals) prefer advanced gains or 
rewards and delayed losses or punishments.
Personality Studies
A number of individual and situational variables 
have been identified as covariates of delay of 
gratification. Mischel found that a preference for 
larger, delayed rewards was significantly correlated 
with need for achievement (Mischel, 1961a), a father in 
the home (Mischel, 1961b), social responsibility 
(Mischel, 1961c), age (Mischel & Metzner, 1962), and 
intelligence (Mischel & Metzner, 1962). In addition, 
the length of the delay interval was negatively 
correlated with a preference for delayed gratification 
(Mischel & Metzner, 1962).
Preferences for rewards and punishers. Mischel 
followed his original studies with investigations of 
preferences for delayed rewarding and aversive events. 
Mischel and Grusec (1967) found that children were more 
likely to choose immediate rewards as the delay to an
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alternative reward increased. Surprisingly, choice of 
punishment was independent of delay. To explain their 
results, Mischel and Grusec (1967) stated that delayed 
rewards were associated with greater risk and were 
avoided. In a later publication, Mischel, Grusec, & 
Masters (1969) concluded that waiting for aversive 
outcomes was, in itself, aversive (Mischel, Grusec, & 
Masters, 19 69). As stated by Yates and Watts (1975), 
"It is as if the person faced with an unpleasant chore 
concludes, 'Well, I might as well get it over with and 
stop worrying about it” (p. 296).
To support their position, Mischel, Grusec, and 
Masters (1969) had adults and children choose between 
rewards and punishments of equal objective value that 
differed only in terms of the delay of their 
occurrence. As hypothesized, the subjective value of a 
reward decreased as delay increased. Delay had no 
influence on the subjective value of punishments for 
children, but delay consistently decreased the 
subjective value of punishments for adults. In other 
words, adults preferred immediate punishments.
Yates and Watts (1975), however, criticized the 
Mischel et. al. (1969) study on procedural grounds.
They pointed out that while subjects were indeed
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choosing between delayed aversive outcomes, 
participation in experiments was required for 
successful completion of a university course. Thus, 
the rewards for participating in the study (e.g., 
successful course completion) may have outweighed the 
aversive outcomes. In a replication that attempted to 
remove these procedural obstacles, Yates and Watts 
(1975) found that subjects were evenly split in their 
preferences for advanced or deferred aversive 
consequences. Yates and Watts (1975) concluded that 
their results generally supported a preference for 
delayed aversive outcomes because subjects that chose 
to advance may not have separated outcome from 
participation compensation.
Discounting of delaved outcomes. If delay of 
reinforcement is associated with an implicit risk, then 
a ratio discounting function should describe choice 
with temporally delayed alternatives (Ortendahl & 
Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986). This model is 
specified as
p = sn/st
where P is the psychological evaluation of the 
prospect, Sm is the subjective scale value for 
magnitude, and St is the subjective scale value for
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time. A ratio discounting function indicates that 
temporally delayed outcomes are evaluated in proportion 
to the magnitude of the outcome. Therefore, ratio 
discounting reduces the subjective value of delayed 
gains and the aversiveness of delayed losses 
(Stevenson, 1986).
In contrast, if delay of negative outcomes is also 
aversive, as suggested by Mischel, Grusec, and Masters 
(1969), then a subtractive discounting function should 
describe choice (Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 
1986). A subtractive model is specified as
p = Sm - St,
such that discounting is independent of outcome 
magnitude. Therefore, subtractive discounting reduces 
the subjective value of delayed gains and increases the 
aversiveness of delayed losses (Stevenson, 1986).
Ortendahl and Sjoberg (1979) tested the fit of 
ratio and subtractive discounting functions to choices 
involving delayed outcomes. They found that different 
response measures tended to fit different functions.
The ratio discounting model tended to fit best when 
magnitude estimates were elicited, while the 
subtractive model was the best fit when a rating of 
favorableness was used as the response measure
Discounting
11
(Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979). Definitive conclusions 
were not forthcoming, however, as the results may have 
been due to a non-linear relation between the observed 
and modeled values.
Stevenson (1986) conducted a more definitive 
investigation of decisions with delayed outcomes. She 
tested the ratio and subtractive discounting functions 
in four experiments by collecting ratings on investment 
options from undergraduates. In the first experiment, 
financial decisions that varied in terms of the amount 
of risk (i.e., probability), delay, and magnitude were 
presented to undergraduates. A multiplicative 
combination (i.e., ratio) of the variables accounted 
for 99.07% of the variance in subjects' decisions.
Stevenson (1986) then sought to determine whether 
the multiplicative relation held when the risky 
component was dropped from the decision problem. She 
found that a ratio discounting function described 
choice for riskless investments with a delayed gain, 
but subjective scale values differed from the risky 
experiment (experiment 1). First, subjective scale 
values for the amount of return were higher when there 
was a component of risk. Second, the psychophysical 
function for time was negatively accelerated for
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riskless investments? for example, the subjective 
difference between one month and two months is larger 
than the subjective difference between 24 months and 25 
months. It will be recalled that the psychophysical 
function for time was linear when there was a component 
of risk.
To determine whether these differences between 
risky and riskless experiments were due to the task or 
the different subject samples, Stevenson (1986) did a 
within-subjects analysis using both risky and riskless 
investments. All subjects rated the risky investments 
from experiment one and the riskless investments in 
experiment two. The results from this experiment 
replicated those of the previous two experiments 
indicating that subjective scale differences were due 
to task rather than subject differences.
In the fourth and final experiment, Stevenson 
(1986) studied riskless decisions with delayed losses. 
She found, consistent with experiment two involving 
delayed gains, that a ratio discounting function 
described subjects' decisions. A temporal delay 
reduced the aversiveness of the investment loss. 
Therefore, Stevenson (1986) found converging evidence
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for the ratio discounting model using both rewarding 
and aversive outcomes.
Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be drawn from studies 
on preferences for delayed outcomes. As first 
suggested by Rotter (1954), delayed outcomes are 
associated with an implicit risk. The conception of 
delay as risky is supported by a ratio discounting 
function for time (Stevenson, 1986). This function 
reduces the value of gains and the aversiveness of 
losses. The effect of time, however, is a negatively 
accelerating function of real time (Chung & Herrnstein, 
1967; Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986). In 
other words, the psychophysical difference between 3 
months and 6 months is larger than the psychophysical 
difference between 21 and 24 months.
Consistent with the ratio discounting function, 
people generally prefer immediate gains (Kahneman & 
Snell, 1990; Mischel & Grusec, 1967; Stevenson, 1986) 
and delayed losses (Stevenson, 1986; Yates & Watts, 
1975). However, this conclusion is based only on 
between-subjects tests. While Stevenson (1986) was 
prudent to use a within-subjects design to investigate 
decisions under risky and riskless circumstances, she
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was remiss in using a between-subjects design to 
investigate preferences for gains and losses. With a 
between-subjects design it is impossible to know 
whether group differences are due to the variable 
manipulation (i.e., gain or loss) or to subject 
characteristics. This criticism is particularly cogent 
given the Yates and Watts (1975) finding that half of 
their subjects preferred advanced losses— a finding 
that is antithetical to Stevenson's (1986) conclusion.
An additional problem with the use of a between- 
subjects design is the inability to compare 
psychophysical functions for magnitude. While 
Stevenson (1986) states that a ratio discounting 
function describes choice for both gains and losses, 
the psychophysical value of magnitude cannot be 
compared for gains and losses despite considerable 
evidence in the decision literature that these two 
functions differ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). A within- 
subjects treatment of outcome type (gain vs. loss) is 
the ideal design for a comparison of the value function 
for gains and losses.
A Learning Model of Delayed Outcomes
It comes as no surprise that a ratio discounting 
function describes choice for delayed outcomes.
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Beginning with the work of Herrnstein (1961), learning 
researchers developed a multiplicative model to 
describe choice for differing values of reinforcer 
magnitude, rate, and delay. The model, known as the 
matching law, is identical to a ratio discounting 
function except that it also considers prior 
reinforcement history (i.e., rate).
The Matching Law
The matching law states that the relative 
frequency of responding on an alternative matches the 
relative frequency of reinforcement for that 
alternative (Herrnstein, 1961, 1970). The law also 
states that responding will match the relative 
magnitude of reinforcement and the reciprocal of the 
delay. The following equation, known as the 
generalized matching law (Baum, 1974), has proven to be 
highly predictive of animal choice:
B1 A1 SA R1 SR D2 SD 
B2 A2 R2 D1
where B is the rate of responding for a given time 
interval on an alternative, A is the amount or 
magnitude of reinforcement delivered over the interval, 
R is the rate of reinforcement over the interval, and D
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is the delay of reinforcement. The exponents represent 
the organism's sensitivity to the variables.
The matching law was first demonstrated in an 
experiment with pigeons (Herrnstein, 1961). The 
pigeons were given the choice of pecking at two keys, 
both of which reinforced the response on variable 
interval schedules. Herrnstein (1961) found that the 
percentage of responses on a key equaled the relative 
percentage of reinforcers obtained from the key.
Chung and Herrnstein (1967) were the first to show 
that relative frequency of responding matched the 
relative immediacy of reinforcement. Pigeons decreased 
the rate of responding (i.e., pecking) on a key from 
.82 to .15 as the delay increased from 1 to 30 seconds. 
In addition, the response functions became less curved 
with increasing delays.
Subsequent to Herrnstein (1961), numerous 
researchers reported data confirming the matching law 
(Herrnstein, 1970). Matching was found when there were 
three response alternatives rather than two (Reynolds, 
1963), when the reinforcers differed in magnitude 
rather than rate (Catania, 1963; Neuringer, 1967), when 
the response was standing on either side of an 
experimental chamber (Baum & Rachlin, 1969), and when
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"yes" responses were plotted against the frequency or 
magnitude of reinforcement in signal detection studies 
with humans (Nevin, 1969). In fact, Herrnstein (1970) 
notes that matching is consistently found as long as 
responding and reinforcements are qualitatively equal. 
For example, it is unlikely that matching will be found 
if one of the response alternatives requires more work, 
or if one of the reinforcers is a preferred food 
(Herrnstein, 1970).
While pigeons are the subject of choice in 
matching law experiments, the equation has been 
demonstrated to adequately describe human choice as 
well. McDowell (1981) showed that a derivative of the 
matching law could account for 99% of the variance in 
the rate of self-injurious scratching. Piecre and 
Epling (1983) found that thirteen of sixteen studies of 
human responding on interval schedules conformed to the 
matching law.
The Matching Law and Irrational Choice
The matching law shows, as one of its interesting 
predictions, the tendency for organisms to be 
temporally myopic in decision making (Herrnstein,
1990). Animals, including humans, overwhelmingly show 
a preference for small, immediate rewards over larger,
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delayed rewards. When animals act in this manner they 
are said to act impulsively (Herrnstein, 1990).
Unlike the Freudian and expectancy theories which 
form the basis of personality research on delayed 
outcomes, the matching law mathematically specifies 
this pervasive temporal myopia. The exponents for 
sensitivity to amount (SA) and sensitivity to delay 
(SD) represent the degree of discounting (Rachlin et 
al., 1986).
The mere discounting of deferred consequences is 
perfectly rational; the banker knows that money today 
is more valuable than money tomorrow because of the 
interest that may be earned. The matching law shows, 
however, that discounting fits a hyperbolic function. 
That is, animals downgrade the rate of discounting with 
increasing delays. As Herrnstein (1990, p. 359) points 
out, if discounting is rational, then the rate of 
discounting should remain fixed: "Fifteen percent a
week is 15% a week, now or next year, in the theory of 
rational choice."
This irrational method of discounting, caused by a 
negatively accelerating psychophysical function for 
time, yields some interesting preference reversals in 
choice. Consider the following example from Schwartz
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and Lacey (1982). A hungry pigeon is given the choice 
of pecking a green key or a red key. Pecks at the 
green key result in four seconds of access to food 
after a four second delay. Pecks at the red key result 
in two seconds of access to food with no delay. As 
predicted by the matching equation, the pigeon will 
select (i.e., peck) the red key approximately 95% of 
the time. In other words, the pigeon acts impulsively 
by choosing the smaller, more immediate reward.
The preference reversal comes when the pigeons are 
presented with two white keys. Fifteen pecks at either 
key (FR15) cause a 10 second delay. If the left, white 
key is selected, the red and green keys are presented 
after the 10 second delay. Again, pecks at the red key 
result in two seconds of immediate food access while 
pecks at the green key result in four seconds of food 
access after a four second delay. If the right, white 
key is pecked only the green key (4 s access, 4 s 
delay) is presented after the 10 second delay. In 
accord with the matching law, the pigeon will choose to 
peck at the right, white key approximately 60% of the 
time. By selecting the key that results in the larger, 
delayed reward the pigeon has, in effect, delayed
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gratification. The downgrading in the rate of temporal 
discounting results in a preference reversal.
There is nothing in the matching law to suggest 
that discounting for gains should be different from 
discounting for losses. A change in the rate of 
discounting for losses relative to gains would require 
a theoretical justification for changing sensitivity to 
amount (SA) (Rachlin et al.# 1986). Although some 
theories have been proposed (cf. Herrnstein, 1990), 
none have received wide support (Rachlin et al.# 1986). 
There is, however, descriptive justification for such a 
change. The value function for prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a theory of risky choice, 
differs for gains and losses.
Prospect Theory 
The Evidence for Rational Choice
When choosing among different degrees of risk, a 
rational decision maker will consider only objective 
probabilities and values. The prescriptive formulation 
of rational choice, expected utility theory (Friedman & 
Savage, 1948), ignores subjective evaluations of risk. 
Instead, expected utility theory prescribes axioms 
necessary for rational choice. The descriptive 
viability of two of those axioms, invariance and
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dominance, will be considered here. Then, a 
descriptive theory of risky choice will be reviewed for 
insights into decision makers' treatment of gains and 
losses.
The invariance axiom. One requirement to be met 
by the rational decision maker is that of invariance. 
This requires that the preference order of choice 
should not change as a result of the way in which the 
options are described. As simple as the criterion of 
invariance may seem, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) report 
that it is consistently violated. Consider the 
following problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1984) (p.
343) :
Problem 1 (N=152): Imagine that the U.S. is 
preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted 200 people will be 
saved. (72%)
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that 600 people will be saved and a
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two-thirds probability that no people will be 
saved. (28%)
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Problem 2 (N=155): If Program C is adopted, 4 00 
people will die. (22%)
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds 
probability that 600 people will die. (78%)
Note that the options in problem 1 and problem 2 
are identical in real terms, and differ only with 
respect to the way in which the outcomes are described. 
When the outcomes are described in positive terms 
(lives saved), as in problem 1, subjects significantly 
favor the risk averse option. When the same outcomes 
are described in negative terms (deaths), as in problem 
2, subjects are risk seeking. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984) report that subjects still wish to select the 
same alternatives even after they have been confronted 
with their irrationality.
The dominance axiom. Rational choice also 
requires that the decision maker meet the criterion of 
dominance. Dominance mandates that if choice A is at 
least as good as choice B in every respect and better 
than choice B in at least one respect, then A should be
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preferred. However, evidence suggests that the 
dominance axiom is also frequently violated. Consider 
the following problem from Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
Problem 3 (N=150): Imagine that you face the
following pair of concurrent decisions. First 
examine both decisions, then indicate the options 
you prefer.
Decision (i). Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240 (84%)
B. 25% chance to gain $1000, and
75% chance to gain nothing (16%)
Decision (ii). Choose between:
A. a sure loss of $750 (13%)
B. 75% chance to lose $1000, and 
25% chance to lose nothing (87%)
The majority of respondents were risk averse in 
decision (i), a problem framed as gains, even though 
the subjective expected utility is higher for option B 
(i.e., $250 versus $240 for option A). Yet these same 
respondents became risk seekers in a problem framed as 
losses.
The violation of invariance and dominance is 
induced by simply changing the description of the 
problem or the problem "frame” (Tversky & Kahneman,
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1981). Kahneman and Tversky (1984) conclude, "In their 
stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual 
illusions more than computational errors" (p. 343).
This gives rise to the reflection effect (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). That is, choice from negative 
prospects mirrors choice from corresponding positive 
prospects. The reflection effect is manifested as risk 
seeking of choices framed in terms of losses and risk 
avoidance of choices framed as gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Prospect Theory's Value and Weighting Functions
Two characteristics of the human decision maker 
contribute to the reflection effect. The first is an 
S-shaped value function that is concave for gains and 
convex for losses. For example, the subjective 
difference between $10 and $20 is perceived as greater 
than the subjective difference between $110 and $120 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In addition, the value 
function is steeper for losses than for gains which 
leads to a robust loss aversion effect. As stated by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), "The displeasure 
associated with losing a sum of money is generally 
greater than the pleasure associated with winning the 
same amount..."(p.454).
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The second characteristic that contributes to the 
framing effect is the weighting of probabilities. Low 
probabilities are overweighted, and moderate and high 
probabilities are underweighted. In addition, certain 
outcomes are overweighted relative to probable 
outcomes. This phenomenon, labeled the certainty 
effect, means that certain gains will be highly 
attractive and certain losses highly aversive.
Research Investigations of Framing
The framing effect described by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) is robust and is evinced by 
sophisticated and naive respondents alike (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). Although research on framing effects 
is neither voluminous nor unequivocal, the findings 
generally support risk avoidance of gains and risk 
seeking of losses. A review of these studies and their 
findings follows.
Risk seeking of losses and risk aversion of gains 
were demonstrated in gambles with complete and 
incomplete information in a variety of tasks devised by 
Levin and his colleagues (Levin, Johnson, Russo, & 
Deldin, 1985; Levin, Johnson, Deldin, Carstens,
Cressey, & Davis, 1986) . Specifically, it was found 
that subjects were more likely to accept gambles framed
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in terms of probability of winning than probability of 
losing. When probability information was missing 
("amount to be won” only) there was no effect for the 
frame. A further examination by Levin et al. (1986) 
revealed the locus of the framing effect to be in the 
decision weight associated with the probability. In 
other words, the problem frame appears to affect the 
subjective likelihood of winning or losing (Levin et 
al., 1986).
Decision frames have also been implicated in 
escalation of committment to a failing course of action 
(Northcraft & Neale, 1986). According to Northcraft 
and Neale (1986), the decision maker faced with the 
dilemma of pumping more money into a failing investment 
may consider the decision as a choice between a certain 
loss and a low probability of a gain or a high 
probability of an even greater loss. Because decision 
makers are risk seeking of losses and overestimate low 
probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it is 
expected that persistence in the failing course would 
occur. Northcraft and Neale (1986) obtained results 
consistent with this hypothesis. They also found that 
increasing the salience of opportunity costs decreased
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persistence by rendering the certain loss less averse 
(Northcraft & Neale, 1986).
Not only may task characteristics produce a 
framing effect, but research supports a framing effect 
for role characteristics as well (Neale, Huber, & 
Northcraft, 1987). In sales negotiations, buyers may 
focus on the loss of money, while sellers may focus on 
dollar gain. Neale et al. (1987) found, in support of
their hypothesis, that negotiator role framed the 
context and resulted in biased decisions.
The preference for risky alternatives may also be 
influenced by decision frames when groups make 
decisions (Schurr, 1987). Negotiating teams consisting 
of Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students 
selected more risky purchase alternatives when they 
were induced to think of losses as opposed to gains 
(Schurr, 1987). These results extend the findings of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) because the focus is on 
degree of risk taking rather than on risk seeking or 
aversion per se (Schurr, 1987).
The limits of information frames were tested by 
Levin, Schnittjer, and Thee (1988) who examined social 
and personal and moral decisions. They found that 
framing the incidence of cheating among college
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students (65% cheated or 35% never cheated) affected 
the perceived incidence of cheating, but the frame had 
no effect on whether the subjects would report a 
cheater or cheat themselves. However, framing the 
success of a medical technique (50% success rate or 50% 
failure rate) affected the perceived effectiveness of 
the technique and the likelihood that the technique 
would be recommended to a friend and family member.
This result is consistent with the finding that 
individuals are more likely to choose risky medical 
options framed positively (Wilson, Kaplan, & 
Schneiderman, 1987). Levin et al. attribute the 
difference obtained between the two decisions (i.e., 
cheating and medical technique) in their study to the 
amount of attention subjects must pay to the scenario 
to make an informed judgment in the medical technique 
decision.
Elliott and Achibald (1989) suggested that a 
weakness in framing research is that the frames are 
imposed on the subjects by the experimenter. In their 
studies, the choice outcomes were worded in a way such 
that subjects would impose their own frame. Results 
were consistent with the prospect theory prediction. 
Subjects who viewed the problem in terms of gains
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avoided risk, whereas subjects who viewed the problem 
in terms of losses were risk seeking.
A study by Fagley and Miller (1987) called into 
question the robustness of the framing effect. In a 
decision problem concerning cancer treatments, most of 
the MBA students selected the risk averse option 
regardless of frame (lives saved versus deaths).
Because the MBA subjects in the study had exposure to 
the concept of expected value, a replication was 
performed using graduate students in education.
Framing effects consistent with prospect theory were 
obtained with the education students, but the 
proportion of subjects selecting the risk seeking 
option in the negative frame was significantly lower 
than the proportions reported by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981).
One major problem with Kahneman and Tversky's 
(1979) demonstration of reflection is that preference 
reversals were measured across subjects. As Hershey 
and Shoemaker (1980) note, a between-subjects design 
showing risk aversion for gains with one group of 
subjects and risk seeking for losses with another group 
of subjects does not measure individual preference
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reversals. Individual reversals may only be measured 
utilizing a within-subjects design.
Hershey and Shoemaker (1980) examined individual 
and group preferences in three separate experiments.
In two of the experiments, preference reversals were 
inconsistent for both groups and individuals. In the 
third experiment, which had a very large sample size 
(n=2080), individual preference reversals consistent 
with prospect theory occurred in significantly more 
than 50% of the subjects for all problems. While 
reflection consistent with prospect theory was the most 
prevalent across all three experiments, Hershey and 
Shoemaker (1980) conclude that reflection is most 
likely to occur when prospects involve small amounts, 
extreme probabilities, or very large amounts.
Schneider and Lopes (1986) also examined the 
reflection effect both between and within subjects. 
Their study was unique, however, in that subjects were 
classified according to risk style (i.e., risk-averse 
or risk-seeking) and multi-outcome lotteries were used. 
Reflection for all subjects was irregular except for 
lotteries that were riskless (i.e., some amount would 
be won or lost). For both risk-averse and risk-seeking
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subjects, riskless lotteries were preferred for gains 
but not for losses (Schneider & Lopes, 1986).
Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1987) used a sample 
(n=134) of economics and computer science majors who 
made binary choices for gains and losses over a period 
of ten weeks. The choices involved large sums, and 
subjects were told that at least one payment would be 
made. They found that only 41% of their subjects 
behaved in accord with the reflection effect.
Moreover, there was no correlation between attitudes on 
the gain side and attitudes on the loss side. Subjects 
also appeared to be insensitive to probabilities when 
losses were involved.
The Cohen et al. (1987) study appears to supply 
stronger evidence in opposition to the prospect theory 
value function, but there is reason to doubt the 
strength of their conclusions. First, their subjects, 
economics and computer science majors, had some 
background in probability theory. Second, the study 
was completed over a span of 10 weeks. It is likely 
that any subject who persisted in the study for 10 
weeks had some interest in the topic under examination. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the subjects 
discussed their choices among themselves. Third, there
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is a special concern that the sample consisted, at 
least partially, of economics majors. Prospect theory 
was first published by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in 
Econometrica. one of the leading economics journals. 
Conclusions
As was stated in the introduction, the research 
findings on generally support the framing effect, 
although the effect is not as robust as first reported 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Reflection consistent 
with prospect theory seems most likely to occur when 
prospects involve very small or large amounts, when 
there are extreme probabilities, and when the prospect 
is riskless (i.e., some amount is certain to be won or 
lost). Any true test of the reflection effect must 
also be conducted utilizing a within-subjects design.
A Comparison of Prospect Theory and the Matching Law
Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel (1986) 
published a paper in which Kahneman and Tversky's 
(1979) prospect theory was compared with Herrnstein's 
(1961) matching law. The paper is a seminal work in 
that it bridges the gap between the main cognitive and 
behavioral theories of choice.
Rachlin et al. (1986) argue that the two models of 
choice, prospect theory and the matching law, are
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conceptually similar because of the correspondence 
between delay and probability. That is, probability 
may be viewed as the inverse of delay (Mazur, 1985; 
Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, & Cross, 1987; Rotter, 1954). 
As an example, if subjects were confronted with 
repeated choices between a gamble with a .5 chance of 
$10 and .25 chance of $20, the subject could expect a 
payoff every two choices for the .5 probability and 
every four choices for the .25 probability.
Because probability and the inverse of delay are 
conceptually similar, there is convergence between the 
findings in cognitive and behavioral studies. The 
finding in behavioral studies that animals sharply 
discount delayed positive reinforcement (e.g., Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967) corresponds to Kahneman and Tversky's 
(1979) finding of risk aversion for gains. Conversely, 
the finding in behavioral studies that animals prefer 
delayed aversive stimuli (e.g., Deluty, Whitehouse, 
Mellitz, & Hineline, 1983) corresponds to Kahneman and 
Tversky's finding of risk seeking for losses. 
Probability as Delay in Repeated Gambles
Rachlin et al. (1986) empirically demonstrated how
probabilities function as delays to reinforcement.
Their subjects were presented with two spinners and
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were asked to choose one. The $100 spinner was called 
"the sure thing" and had a 17/18 chance of winning 
associated with it. The $250 spinner was the risky 
gamble which initially had a 7/18 chance of winning 
associated with it. A titration procedure was used 
such that if subjects selected the sure thing on one 
trial, the risky option was made more attractive by 
increasing the odds of winning by 1/18. Similarly, if 
subjects selected the risky option, it was made less 
attractive by decreasing the odds of winning by 1/18. 
Presumably, the titration procedure would serve to keep 
both options equally attractive. For one group of 
subjects the experiment was conducted as quickly as 
possible. A second group of subjects was required to 
wait 1.5 minutes between gambles. Results showed that 
long intervals between gambles resulted in risk averse 
choices, whereas short intervals between gambles 
resulted in risky choices. Thus, the long delays 
produced choices for near certain outcomes which may be 
seen as a form of impulsiveness.
Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, and Cross (1987) used a 
two-stage choice procedure to demonstrate that 
impulsiveness could be used to induce commitment to a 
gamble. They showed that when probability of advancing
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to the second stage of a gamble (where money was 
available) was low, undergraduates committed to a 
chance to win a large, low probability award. However, 
when probability of advancing to the second stage was 
high, subjects preferred to commit to a gamble that 
allowed a choice between a small, high probability 
reward and a large, low probability award. When faced 
with this choice in the second stage, subjects 
significantly preferred the small, high probability 
reward. Their behavior was much like the pigeons that 
chose to peck at red and green keys: When the delay to
reward choice is long (i.e., low probability), a large, 
delayed (i.e., large, low probability) reward is 
preferred. When the delay to choice is brief (i.e., 
high probability), a small, immediate (i.e., small, 
high probability) reward is preferred.
The Rachlin et al. (1986) study was replicated by
Silberberg, Murray, Christensen, & Asano (1988), but a 
confound in the study was detected. Silberberg et al. 
noted that subjects who experienced a short interval 
between gambles may have expected more trials, and thus 
may have implicitly perceived that they had less to 
loose on each gamble. To control this potential 
confound, both long and short interval conditions were
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restricted to 10 gambles. Under this restriction, 
there was no difference in risky choice between the two 
groups, suggesting that potential income affects risky 
choice. This explanation was tested directly by 
informing subjects that they had been given $10 or 
$10,000 before the repeated gambles had begun. Under 
these conditions, the high income group was 
significantly more likely to select the risky gamble.
The repeated gambles experiments described above 
provide some evidence that probability and delay are 
conceptually similar. The Silberberg et al. (1988) 
study suggests that income, either implicitly or 
explicitly stated, affects the value function for 
gains. Although the confound they identify has 
intuitive appeal, it seems likely that the results they 
report were due to experimenter demand, particularly 
when subjects were told that they had been given 
$10,000. Recall that the Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, and 
Cross (1987) study demonstrated convergence with animal 
studies of the matching law. Presumably, Silberberg 
and his colleagues would provide an account of a 
pigeon's preference for smaller, temporally advanced 
food rewards that refers to the pigeon's implicit
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expectation of a greater opportunity to eat under these 
conditions.
Conclusions
Rachiin's demonstration of convergence between 
cognitive and behavioral explanations of choice may, if 
valid, lead to a unification of these fields. Although 
the empirical evidence seems to demonstrate that risk 
is associated with delay, there is no evidence that the 
value functions obtained under conditions of risk are 
related to the value functions obtained under riskless 
conditions involving a delay. There is evidence that 
the reflection effect predicted by prospect theory is 
more likely to occur when there is a riskless component 
to choice (Schneider & Lopes, 1986); however, there has 
not been an empirical test of the prospect theory value 
function in a riskless context.
The Proposed Investigation
Experiments on delayed rewards and punishers 
support a discounting function in which delayed 
outcomes are evaluated in proportion to the magnitude 
of the return (Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 
1986). A ratio discounting model implies that delay is 
treated as a risk; that is, temporal delay reduces the
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value of gains and the aversiveness of losses 
(Stevenson, 1986). Therefore, a ratio discounting 
function predicts that individuals will prefer 
immediate gains and delayed losses.2
The matching law (Herrnstein, 1961), like a ratio 
discounting function, also states that delay influences 
choice through a multiplicative relationship.
Herrnstein (1990) points out that the rate of 
discounting declines with time. Ortendahl and Sjoberg 
(1979) and Stevenson (1986) also found that the effect 
of time is a negatively accelerated function of real 
time.
There have not been any studies of individual 
preferences for delayed gains and losses with outcome 
type treated as a within-subjects variable. Stevenson 
(1986) found support for a ratio discounting function 
with both gains and losses, but the two experiments 
used different samples. Thus, the proposed 
investigation would be the first within-subjects 
comparison of individual preferences for both gains and 
losses.
In addition, there is not an accepted theoretical 
rationale offered by proponents of a ratio discounting 
function or matching law as to how a person's
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discounting of gains should compare to the discounting 
of losses. Theoreticians have suggested, however, that 
the matching law and prospect theory (a theory of risky 
choice) are conceptually similar (Rachlin et al.,
1986). Specifically, probability in prospect theory is 
equivalent to the inverse of delay in the matching law.
If the matching law and prospect theory simply 
explain the same phenomenon with different paradigmatic 
approaches, then the psychophysical values for delayed 
gains and losses should correspond to the prospect 
theory value function. The prospect theory value 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses, 
and it is steeper for losses than for gains.
Translated to choice, this means that individuals are 
risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking for losses. The 
steeper curve for losses also contributes to a robust 
loss aversion effect. This would be expected to lead 
to a steeper discounting rate for delayed losses 
relative to delayed gains. In other words, the outcome 
frame should influence the rate of discounting.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1, A ratio discounting function will 
describe individual choice for both gains and losses.
(a) Immediate gains will be preferred to delayed
gains.
(b) Delayed losses will be preferred to immediate
losses.
Hypothesis 2. Larger, delayed gains will be 
preferred if the advanced, smaller gain is temporally 
removed.
Hypothesis 3. Preferences for delayed losses will 
be stronger than preferences for immediate gains.
Stevenson (198 6) found, using a between-subjects 
design, that a ratio discounting function described 
choice for gains and losses. Parts "a" and "b" of 
Hypothesis 1 represent an attempt to replicate and 
extend Stevenson's (1986) finding. This investigation 
improves upon Stevenson's study in two ways. First, 
outcome type (gain or loss) is a within-subjects 
variable in the present investigation. This is an 
important distinction as it permits a test of the ratio 
discounting function for both gains and losses without 
the potential confounding effects of subject 
differences. Second, both binary preferences and
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preference ratings serve as dependent variables in the 
present investigation. Stevenson relied solely on 
preference ratings in her investigation, a design 
which lacks external validity for the study of choice 
behavior.
Numerous researchers have reported a negatively 
accelerating psychophysical function for time (Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967; Herrnstein, 1990; Ortendahl &
Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986). Hypothesis 2 is an 
attempt to replicate and extend that finding. The 
present investigation is the first to utilize the 
cognitive paradigm with binary preference as the 
dependent variable.
Hypothesis 3 is a test of the Rachlin et al. (1986) 
proposition that prospect theory should apply to 
riskless choice. Because respondents are risk seeking 
in the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain 
of gains, and because the value function proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is steeper for losses, a 
negative frame should result in a steeper rate of 
discounting. That is, subjects should prefer delayed 
losses more than they prefer immediate gains. To 
paraphrase Kahneman & Tversky (1984, p. 342), a delayed
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loss of $X is less aversive than an immediate gain of 
$X is attractive.
Method
Overview
The sample consisted of upper level accounting 
majors. The study was divided into two sessions. In 
the first session, subjects were presented with 64 two- 
option prospects involving delayed gains and losses. 
Preference was operationalized in the first session as 
binary choice which yielded nominal data. The second 
session was conducted a week later. In this session, 
subjects were presented with the same 64 two-option 
prospects, with choice operationalized as a preference 
rating. After completing the problems, open-ended 
questions were used to assess strategies in selecting 
and rating the options.
Subjects
The subjects were upper level accounting majors 
enrolled in an information systems course. The study 
was completed in two sessions, and there was some 
subject mortality. In session 1 (binary choice), 31 
subjects completed the study. Of this sample, 15 
(48.4%) were male and 16 (51.6%) were female. Their 
ages ranged from 21 to 43 (M=28.29). In session 2
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(preference rating), 2 6 subjects completed the study.
Of this sample, 12 (46.2%) were male and 14 (53.8%) 
were female. They ranged in age from 21 to 43 
(M=28.50).
Apparatus
The packet of stimulus materials contained 
instructions for completion, examples, and 64 prospects 
requiring a choice by the subject. Each prospect 
contained two options. The choice was always between a 
larger, temporally delayed gain (loss) and a smaller, 
immediate or temporally advanced gain (loss). 
Presentation of the larger, temporally delayed option 
varied between option A and option B. (Note. For 
purposes of analysis, the problems were recoded such 
that option A was always the samller, immediate or 
temporally advanced option. Thus, all presentations of 
methodology and results which refer to option A or 
option B reflect this recoding.) The stimulus packets 
for sessions 1 and 2 appear in Appendix A and B, 
respectively.
Procedure
The stimulus materials were administered following 
class periods. Two sessions were needed to complete 
the study. In the first session, subjects indicated
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their preference by circling either the letter A or the 
letter B (binary choice). The second session was 
conducted a week after the first, and subjects 
indicated their preference by making a rating along a 
17-point scale, where 8 on the left end indicated a 
strong preference for option A, 0 indicated 
indifference, and 8 on the right end indicated a strong 
preference for option B. After completing the 64 
prospects, open-ended questions assessed the subjects' 
knowledge of temporal discounting, the strategies used 
to make choices for prospects involving gains and 
losses, and strategies used to make choices between 
outcomes with differing delays.
Independent variables. The four independent 
variables were magnitude of the outcome, outcome type, 
option A delay, and option B delay. There were four 
levels of magnitude ($100, 200, 400, and 800), two 
levels of outcome type (gain and loss), two levels of 
option A delay (immediate and half of option B delay), 
and four levels of option B delay (4, 10, 18, and 24 
months). The magnitude of option A was held constant 
at 75% of the magnitude of option B. All four of the 
independent variables were within-subjects; thus, each
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subject completed a total of 64 problems in each 
session.
Dependent variables. The two dependent variables 
were binary choice and preference rating. In the first 
session, subjects indicated their preference for each 
of the 64 problems by circling either the letter A or
B. Subjects indicated their preferences in the second 
session, which was conducted a week after the first, by 
making a rating along a 17-point scale.
Results
The first open-ended question asked subjects to 
indicate their knowledge of temporal discounting. Only 
the open-ended questions from the first session were 
content-coded because the majority of subjects did not 
complete these questions in the second session. Of the 
31 subjects who participated in the first session, 25 
(80.6%) reported having some knowledge of discounting,
3 (9.7%) reported having no knowledge of discounting, 
and 3 (9.7%) did not answer.
Results for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that a ratio discounting 
function would describe choice for both gains and 
losses. This entailed two predictions: (a) Immediate
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gains will be preferred to delayed gains; and (b) 
Delayed losses will be prefered to immediate losses.
This hypothesis was analyzed in three ways.
First, frequency counts were made of subjects' binary 
choices, and the data were analyzed using the chi- 
square test. Second, preference ratings were analyzed 
using a within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Third, responses to the open-ended questions were 
content coded and frequency counts were made.
Binary Choice. There were 16 prospects in which 
subjects chose between an immediate and delayed gain. 
Subjects significantly preferred the smaller, immediate 
gain to the larger, delayed gain for 14 of those 
prospects. There were two prospects in which subjects 
showed no significant preference. Both of these 
involved relatively large magnitudes ($400 and $800) 
and relatively brief delays (4 months). These results 
are presented in Table 1.
There were also 16 prospects in which subjects 
chose between an immediate and delayed loss. Subjects 
significantly preferred the larger, delayed loss for 
nine of those prospects. The seven prospects for which 
the delayed loss was not significantly preferred all
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Table 1
Number of Subjects Choosing Advanced and Delaved 
Options. Chi Square Values, and Significance
Prospect Advanced Delayed X2 p
100 4 75,1 23 8 7.258 **
-100 4 -75,1 15 16 0.857
100 4 75,2 14 17 0.290
-100 4 -75,2 19 12 1.581
100 10 75,1 26 5 14.226 ***
-100 10 -75,1 11 20 2.613
100 10 75,5 17 14 0.290
-100 10 -75,5 12 19 1.581
100 18 75,1 26 5 14 .226 * * *
-100 18 -75, I 5 26 14.226 ***
100 18 75,9 24 7 9 . 323 **
-100 18 -75,9 11 20 2.613
100 24 75,1 27 4 17.065 ***
-100 24 -75,1 2 29 23.516 ***
100 24 75, 12 26 5 14 . 226 ***
-100 24 -75,12 10 21 3 . 903 *
200 4 150, I 21 10 3.903 *
-200 4 -150,I 10 21 3.903 *
200 4 150, 2 17 14 0.290
-200 4 -150,2 22 9 5. 452 *
200 10 150,1 25 6 11.645 **
-200 10 -150,I 12 19 1.581
200 10 150, 5 21 10 3 .903 *
-200 10 -150,5 17 14 0.290
200 18 150,1 26 5 14.226 * * *
-200 18 -150,1 6 25 11.645 **
200 18 150, 9 25 6 11.645 **
-200 18 -150,9 10 21 3.903 *
200 24 150,1 26 5 14.226 * * *
-200 24 -150,I 6 25 11.645 **
200 24 150,12 24 7 9.323 **
-200 24 -150,12 13 18 0.806
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Table 1 (continued)
Number of Subjects Choosing Advanced and Delaved 
Options. Chi Square Values, and Significance
Prospect Advanced Delayed
CMX
P
400 4 300 I 17 14 0.290
-400 4 -300 I 13 18 0. 806
400 4 300 2 13 18 0.806
-400 4 -300 2 15 16 0.032
400 10 300 I 21 10 3 .903 i f
-400 10 -300 I 13 18 0.806
400 10 300 5 19 12 1.581
-400 10 -300 5 14 17 0.290
400 18 300 I 26 5 14 . 226 i f i t i f
-400 18 -300 I 5 26 14.226 i f * i f
400 18 300 9 22 9 5.452 i f
-400 18 -300 9 11 20 2. 613
400 24 300 I 29 2 23.516 i f * i f
-400 24 -300 I 7 . 24 9.323 i f  i f
400 24 300 1 24 7 9.323 i f  i f
-400 24 -300 1 14 17 0.290
800 4 600 I 13 18 0. 806
-800 4 -600 I 15 16 0. 032
800 4 600 2 14 17 0.290
-800 4 -600 2 20 11 2.613
800 10 600 I 21 10 3.903 i f
-800 10 -600 I 12 19 1.581
800 10 600 5 17 14 0. 290
-800 10 -600 5 19 12 1.581
800 18 600 I 25 6 11.645 i f  i f
-800 18 -600 I 8 23 7.258 i f  i f
800 18 600 9 22 9 5.452 i f
-800 18 -600 9 16 15 0.032
800 24 600 I 25 6 11.645 i f  i f
-800 24 -600 I 6 25 11.645 i f  i f
800 24 600 12 23 8 7.258 **
-800 24 600 12 16 15 0. 032
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<. 001 (all two-tailed)
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invloved relatively brief delays. When the delay to 
the larger loss was 4 months, there was no significant 
difference in preferences at three of the magnitude 
levels. The exception was the $200/$150 level; here, 
the larger, delayed loss was significantly preferred. 
When the delay to the larger loss was 10 months, there 
was no significant difference in preferences at all 
four magnitude levels. These results are reported in 
Table 1.
To assess individual preferences across gains and 
losses, subjects' responses were coded into one of four 
reflection types (across outcome) for each combination 
of magnitude and delay (i.e., advanced gain, advanced 
loss; delayed gain, advanced loss; advanced gain, 
delayed loss; and delayed gain, delayed loss). For 58 
of the 64 prospects, reflection consistent with the 
prospect theory value function (i.e., advanced gain, 
delayed loss) was significantly more prevalent than any 
other reflection type. For the other six prospects, no 
single reflection type was significantly more prevalent 
than another. These prospects were of relatively high 
magnitude (i.e., $400 or $800) and brief delay (i.e., 4 
or 10 months). In addition, the advanced, smaller 
option tended to be temporally removed in these
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prospects. The single exception was the $800 in 4 
months; $600 immediate prospect. These results are 
reported in Table 2.
Preference ratings. Preference ratings were 
recoded such that a rating of 8 on the right end of the 
scale ("strong preference for option A") became 1, a 
rating of 0 (neutral) became 9, and a rating of 8 on 
the left end ("strong preference for option B") became 
17. The analysis of subjects' preference ratings 
revealed a significant main effect for outcome type F
(1,25)=7. 60, p=.011. Gains received significantly 
lower ratings (M=5.95) than losses (M=10.96).
Individual t-tests for each prospect across gains and 
losses were not conducted because such a large number 
of analyses (32) would capitalize on chance. However, 
a visual inspection of the mean ratings reveals that 
every prospect, with one exception, that was described 
in terms of a loss received a higher rating (indicating 
a stronger preference for the delayed option) relative 
to the same prospect described as a gain. Means and 
standard deviations of preference ratings appear in 
Table 3. Figure 1 presents the preference ratings for 
all prospects involving an immediate option.
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Table 2
Reflection in Individual Preferences Across Gains and
Losses of the Same Maanitude
Prospect 1 2  3 4 X2 P
100 4 75, I 9 6 14 2 9.903 **
100 4 75, 2 4 15 10 2 13.516 **
100 10 75, I 7 4 19 1 24.097 * * *
100 10 75, 5 2 10 15 4 13.516 **
100 18 75, I 2 3 24 2 45.516 * * *
100 18 75, 9 7 4 17 3 15.839 ***
100 24 75, I 1 1 26 3 57.645 ***
100 24 75, 12 5 5 21 0 32.355 ***
200 4 150 I 2 8 19 2 24.871 * * *
200 4 150 2 9 13 8 1 9.645 *
200 10 150 I 6 6 19 0 24.871 ***
200 10 150 5 8 9 13 1 9.645 *
200 18 150 I 4 2 22 3 35.194 * * *
200 18 150 9 6 4 19 2 22.806 * * *
200 24 150 I 2 4 24 1 46.032 * * *
200 24 150 12 8 5 16 2 14.032 **
400 4 300 I 2 11 15 3 15.323 **
400 4 300 2 3 12 10 6 6.290
400 10 300 I 3 10 18 0 24.871 ***
400 10 300 5 6 8 13 4 5.774
400 18 300 I 3 2 23 3 40.097 * * *
400 18 300 9 4 7 18 2 19.710 * * *
400 24 300 I 5 2 24 0 47.065 * * *
400 24 300 12 10 4 14 3 10.419 *
800 4 600 I 5 10 8 8 1.645
800 4 600 2 7 13 7 4 5.516
800 10 600 I 5 7 16 3 12.742 **
800 10 600 5 7 12 10 2 7.323
800 18 600 I 4 4 21 2 30.548 * * *
800 18 600 9 10 6 12 3 6.290
800 24 600 I 1 5 24 1 46.806 * * *
800 24 600 12 9 7 14 1 11.194 *
Note. Reflection type l=advanced gain, advanced loss; 
2=delayed gain, advanced loss; 3=advanced gain, delayed 
loss; and 4=delayed gain, delayed loss.
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (all two-tailed)
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Preference Ratings
Prospect M SD
100 4 75,1 6.154 5.641
-100 4 -75,1 10.385 6.060
100 4 75,2 7.654 5.912
-100 4 -75,2 10.231 6. 002
100 10 75,1 5.885 6.002
-100 10 -75,1 11.115 5.764
100 10 75,5 6.000 4.964
-100 10 -75,5 10.462 6. 107
100 18 75,1 4.462 5.331
-100 18 -75,1 11.962 5.930
100 18 75,9 5.731 4.904
-100 18 -75,9 11.462 5.874
100 24 75,1 4 . 000 5. 192
-100 24 -75,1 12.654 5.462
100 24 75, 12 5.731 5. 356
-100 24 -75,12 10.077 6. 105
200 4 150, I 7.692 6. 329
-200 4 -150,I 11.654 5. 329
200 4 150,2 7.885 6. 108
-200 4 -150,2 10.346 5.858
200 10 150,1 5.423 5.529
-200 10 -150,1 10.962 5.834
200 10 150, 5 6. 308 5. 342
-200 10 -150,5 10.808 5.755
200 18 150,1 4.885 5. 187
-200 18 -150,I 12.039 5.956
200 18 150,9 5. 654 5. 344
-200 18 -150,9 10.962 5.923
200 24 150, I 4.539 5. 240
-200 24 -150,1 12.346 5. 192
200 24 150,12 5. 692 5. 312
-200 24 -150,12 9.462 6. 048
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Table 3 (continued)
Means and Standard Deviations for Preference Ratings
Prospect M SD
400 4 300 I 6.385 5.967
-400 4 -300 I 11.539 5.559
400 4 300 2 8.269 6.521
-400 4 -300 2 8.192 5.973
400 10 300 I 5.692 5.432
-400 10 -300 I 12.096 5.489
400 10 300 5 6. 615 5.550
-400 10 -300 5 10.692 5.843
400 18 300 I 4.539 5.101
-400 18 -300 I 12.039 5.560
400 18 300 9 5. 462 5.117
-400 18 -300 9 11.500 5.975
400 24 300 I 4. 346 5. 051
-400 24 -300 I 12.077 5.932
400 24 300 12 6.500 5.442
-400 24 -300 12 10.385 5.987
800 4 600 I 7.039 6.594
-800 4 -600 I 9. 692 5.816
800 4 600 2 7.077 6. 273
-800 4 -600 2 8.500 6.275
800 10 600 I 5.192 5.706
-800 10 -600 I 11.923 5.542
800 10 600 5 7.885 6.199
-800 10 -600 5 9.154 6.104
800 18 600 I 5.192 5.671
-800 18 -600 I 12.231 5.332
800 18 600 9 6.346 5.462
-800 18 -600 9 10.039 6. 309
800 24 600 I 4 .654 5. 059
-800 24 -600 I 12.269 5.654
800 24 600 12 5.692 5. 365
-800 24 600 12 11.385 5. 665
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Open-ended responses. After making their choices 
for the 64 prospects in session 1, subjects were asked 
to explain any rules or strategies they used in 
choosing between gains and losses. Twenty-four (77.4%) 
subjects responded to the query. For gains, 15 (62.5%) 
subjects indicated that their strategy was to choose 
the immediate or more advanced option, five (20.8%) 
subjects indicated that both magnitude and delay of the 
options played a role in their choices, two (8.3%) 
subjects indicated that they would wait to maximize 
their gain, and two subjects were ambiguous in their 
response.
For losses, 16 (66.7%) subjects indicated that 
their strategy was to choose the delayed option. Four 
(16.7%) subjects indicated that both magnitude and 
delay were considered in their choice, one (4.2%) 
subject indicated that a strategy which minimized the 
loss was used, and one subject responded ambiguously. 
Results for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that larger, delayed gains 
would be preferred if the advanced, smaller gain was 
temporally removed. This result would be expected if
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the psychophysical value of time is a negatively 
accelerating function of real time.
Two methods were used to test this hypothesis. 
First, a chi-square test was used to analyze the binary 
choice data. Second, a within-subjects ANOVA was used 
to analyze the preference ratings. Although an open- 
ended question asked about strategies used in choosing 
between delays, very few subjects responded to the 
query? therefore, no content-coded data will be 
presented for this hypothesis.
Binary choice. This hypothesis was not supported 
by the binary choice data. When the length of the 
delay to the larger gain was four months, there was no 
significant difference in subjects' preferences at all 
four magnitude levels. When the delay to the larger 
gain was 10 months, there was no significant difference 
in preferences at three of the magnitude levels. The 
exception was the $200/$150 level, but the difference 
was opposite from the predicted direction. When the 
delay to the larger gain was 18 or 24 months, subjects 
significantly preferred the smaller, advanced gain at 
all magnitude levels. Thus, for relatively lengthy 
delays, subjects' preferences were opposite from the
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predicted direction. These results are presented in 
Table 1.
Preference ratings. This hypothesis was not 
supported by the preference rating data. There was not 
a significant difference in ratings when the smaller 
magnitude option was immediate (M=8.53) or half the 
delay of the larger magnitude option (M=8.59) 
F(l,25)=0.79, p=.382.
Results for Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the preference for 
delayed losses would be stronger than the preference 
for immediate gains. This follows from the value 
function from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) which is concave for gains, convex for losses, 
and steeper in the domain of losses relative to gains. 
Specifically, it was predicted that the binary choice 
data would show a higher percentage of subjects 
choosing delayed losses than the percentage choosing 
immediate gains. Similarly, it was expected that the 
preference rating data would indicate a stronger 
preference for delayed losses relative to immediate 
gains.
Binary choice. Although the data cannnot be 
submitted to a statistical analysis because it violates
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the chi square assumption of independence, a visual 
inspection of the percentages reveals that the 
hypothesis was not supported. There were only three 
prospects for which the percentage of subjects choosing 
the delayed ioss was greater than the percentage 
choosing the immediate gain, and the difference between 
the percentages was small. These were at the $100 
level when the delay to the larger gain (loss) was 24 
months, and the $4 00 and $800 level when the delay to 
the larger gain (loss) was 4 months. For all other 
prospects, either the percentage favoring immediate 
gains was slightly greater than the percentage favoring 
delayed losses or there was no difference in the 
percentages. Figure 2 presents these results.
Preference ratings. A within-subjects ANOVA was 
used to analyze the preference rating data (see 
Footnote 1). Analyses revealed that preferences varied 
significantly as a function of outcome type, F
(1,25)=8.30, pc.01, but the results were in the 
opposite direction of the prediction. The effect 
accounted for 14% of the total variance. Subjects' 
ratings revealed a significantly stronger preference 
for immediate gains (M=5.96) relative to delayed losses 
(M=7.12).
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Figure 2. Percentage of subjects favoring immediate 
gains and delayed losses.
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Figure 2. (Cont.) Percentage of subjects favoring 
immediate gains and delayed losses.
Magnitude level 400
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Additional Significant Results
As the analysis of variance results presented in 
Table 4 reveal, there were some significant 
interactions that were not hypothesized. Effect sizes 
for each interaction were calculated assuming an 
additive model. Because none of the significant 
interactions accounted for more than 1.1% of the total 
variance, post hoc comparisons were not conducted.
There was a significant two-way interaction 
between delay for option B and outcome which accounted 
for 1.1% of the total variance. For gains, analysis of 
ratings revealed a stronger preference for the smaller 
magnitude, immediate or advanced option with increasing 
delays. For losses, analysis showed a stronger 
preference for the larger magnitude, delayed option 
with increasing delays. This interaction is presented 
in Figure 3.
There was also a significant two-way interaction 
between delay for option A and outcome which accounted 
for 1.1% of the total variance. For gains, subjects 
showed a stronger preference for the smaller magnitude, 
advanced option when it was immediate (M=5.38) relative 
to when it was temporally removed (M=6.94). For 
losses, there was a stronger preference for the larger
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magnitude, delayed option when the smaller option was 
immediate (M=11.67) relative to when it was temporally 
removed (M=10.23). This interaction is presented in 
figure 4.
There was also a significant four-way interaction 
between magnitude, option B delay, outcome, and option 
A delay which accounted for 0.13% of the variance. 
Because of the large number of factors and levels 
involved (4 X 4 X 2 X 2), the interaction was 
impossible to interpret. This interaction is presented 
in figure 5.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to assess the 
correspondence between cognitive and behavioral 
theories of choice as suggested by Rachlin, Logue, 
Gibbon, and Frankel (1986). The unique contribution of 
the study is that the prospect theory value function, 
which was derived from risky choice, was examined in a 
riskless context with temporal delays. The results of 
this thesis advance our understanding of prospect 
theory and choice under delay.
The results support the view that delay is 
associated with an implicit risk? that is, probability
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corresponds to the inverse of delay. In general, 
subjects preferred immediate gains of smaller magnitude 
and delayed losses of larger magnitude. This finding 
is consistent with behavioral examinations of the 
matching law which show that animals prefer immediate
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Table 4
Within-Subi ects Analysis of Variance Table for
Preference Ratinas
Source SS df MS F P w2
1. Magnitude 9.94 3 3.31 .31 .818
2. Delay (B) 41.46 3 13.82 1.51 .219
3. Outcome 10430.02 1 10430.02 7. 60 . 011 .140
4. Delay (A) 10.47 1 10.47 .79 .382
1X2 111.34 9 12.37 1.10 .365
1X3 38. 30 3 12.77 1. 35 .265
1X4 9.83 3 3.28 .47 .707
2X3 816.37 3 272.12 8.89 .000 .011
2X4 5.55 3 1.85 .23 .877
3X4 714.00 1 714.00 26.55 .000 .011
1X2X3 64.53 9 7.17 1.01 .436
1X2X4 62.82 9 6.98 .80 .612
1X3X4 27.43 3 9.15 1.13 .342
2X3X4 30.39 3 10.13 1.18 .324
1X2X3X4 169.60 9 18.84 2.01 .039 .001
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Figure 3. Two-way interaction between delay for option 
B and outcome type.
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Figure 4. Two-way interaction between delay for option 
A and outcome type.
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Figure 5. Four-way interaction between magnitude, 
delay for option A, delay for option B, and outcome 
type.
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rewards and delayed punishments (see Rachlin et al., 
1986). It is also consistent with cognitive 
examinations of prospect theory which show that people 
are risk averse with gains and risk seeking with losses 
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
The second hypothesis, that larger, delayed gains 
would be preferred if the advanced, smaller gain was 
temporally removed was not supported. Although 
numerous researchers (e.g., Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; 
Stevenson, 1986) have reported that the psychophysical 
value of time is a negatively accelerating function of 
real time, the delay to the larger gain was obviously 
perceived as more aversive in this investigation even 
when the smaller gain was temporally removed.
This investigation was also the first to examine 
the correspondence of the prospect theory value 
function in a riskless context. No other study of 
choice with delayed outcomes, in either the cognitive 
or behavioral paradigms, has assessed outcome type 
(i.e., gains vs. losses) utilizing a within-subjects 
design. The prospect theory value function is concave 
for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses 
than for gains. The results of this study did not 
support a corresponding value function for choices
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involving delayed outcomes. The findings of this study 
suggest that subjects' preferences for temporally 
advanced gains are stronger than their preferences for 
delayed losses. This is not consistent with a value 
function that is steeper in the domain of losses.
A fault of the present study is that there may 
have been an undetected carryover effect to the 
preference ratings given that all subjects completed 
binary choices a week prior to making ratings.
Although a carryover effect is possible, subjects' 
binary choices (completed in the first session) were 
not congruent with the prospect theory value function. 
Thus, the value function from propsect theory is not 
consistent with the data even when there are no 
carryover effects. Nevertheless, any replication of 
the present study should include some form of 
counterbalancing for type of value elicitation (binary 
choice vs. preference ratings).
The Limitations of Prospect Theory
The prospect theory value function was derived 
from risky choice but it did not fit with the riskless 
choices in this study even though the temporal 
dimension implied risk. This is consistent with the 
lack of support the value function has obtained from
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within-subject examinations of risky choice (e.g., 
Hershey & Shoemaker, 1980). The present study and 
other methodologically sound examinations of prospect 
theory indicate that there is not a single value 
function that fits across all people and situational 
contexts. It is time that decision researchers moved 
away from a prospect theory analysis of choice and 
moved toward a person and situational analysis.
Schneider and Lopes (1986) provide a useful 
framework for a person and situation analysis of 
choice. They have found that propensity for risk 
taking is a good predictor of individual risky choice 
across gains and losses. Given the correspondence 
between probability and delay, it seems likely that 
this variable would influence choice with delayed 
outcomes as well.
Another potential individual difference variable 
that may predict choice in both risky contexts and 
riskless contexts involving delays is age (C. R. 
Millimet, personal communication, May, 1991). An older 
person may feel as if she or he cannot take risky 
gambles because there is not enough time to rebound 
should a loss occur. Similarly, an older person cannot
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afford to make an investment that does not pay off for 
a long period of time.
There are many situational constraints that may 
influence both risky and riskless choices. A set of 
variables that is of interest to organizational 
researchers is personal and organizational goals. If 
an individual or organization aspired to maximize the 
gain from a prospect, it would make sense to be willing 
to take more risk or to wait a longer period of time 
for the outcome. The converse would be true if there 
was a stated goal to minimize losses.
Overcoming Paradigmatic Limitations
A recent article by Baruch Fischoff (1991) 
highlights the false assumptions that can be made by 
strictly adhering to a single paradigmatic view of 
value elicitation. Fischoff places paradigms of value 
elicitation along a continuum from the philosophy of 
articulated values at one end to the philosophy of 
basic values at the other. The philosophy of 
articulated values holds that people have well-formed 
values and can provide researchers with reponses that 
accurately reflect these values. The philosophy of 
basic values holds that people have well-formed 
opinions on only a limited number of issues.
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Fischoff (1991) notes that prospect theory 
operates from a partial perspective that is somewhere 
in-between articulated and basic values. Although a 
paradigm of value elicitation is useful in that it 
provides a framework for interpreting results, there is 
an inherent flaw in adhering to a single pardigmatic 
view. "...it is in the nature of paradigms that they 
provide clearer indications of relative rather than 
absolute success. That is, they show which 
applications of the set of accepted methods work 
better, rather than whether the set as a whole is up to 
the job" (Fischoff, 1991, p. 837).
With its partial perspectives of value 
elicitation, prospect theory straddles the center of 
the continuum of value elicitation paradigms. Prospect 
theory must be concerned with misunderstood questions 
that would prevent well articulated values from being 
expressed, but it must also be concerned with 
overinterpreting elicited responses from subjects who 
do not possess well-formed opinions (Fischoff, 1991).
The major problem with prospect theory is that it 
is a descriptive theory in search of a value function 
that is not robust. The question of how well a subject 
can articulate opinions about the value of goods is not
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likely to be settled. However, research that addresses 
where values are well articulated would be very 
beneficial as well as informative (Fischoff, 1991). 
Conclusion
This investigation advances our knowledge in the 
understudied area of choices involving delays. It 
reveals that these types of choices are much too 
complex to be understood by a single value function. 
There is a tendency for subjects to prefer immediate 
gains and delayed losses, but this tendency seems to be 
stronger at lower magnitude levels and it is not 
consistent across all subjects. It would be fruitful 
to move from a perspective of modeling this tendency 
with value functions to understanding what factors 
affect individual's choices with delayed outcomes.
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Footnotes
1. To analyze this hypothesis, the data were recoded 
such that a rating of 1 in the domain of gains 
indicated a strong preference for the immediate or 
advanced option, and a rating of 1 in the domain of 
losses indicated a strong preference for the delayed 
option.
Appendix A
The purpose of this investigation is to examine your 
preferences for hypothetical financial gains and losses. In this 
part of the study, you will be asked to choose one of two 
financial outcomes in each problem. There are a total of 64 
problems, and at least one of the financial outcomes in each 
problem is delayed (expressed in months). Please make only one 
choice for each problem by clearly circling either the letter "A" 
or the letter MB".
Even though the financial outcomes in this study are 
hypothetical, we are interested in what you would choose if a 
real amount of money was to be gained or lost. Therefore, we ask 
that you behave as if the outcomes stated in each problem are 
real, and that you behave as if you will gain or loose the amount 
of money expressed by the option you choose. We also ask that 
you make a choice for each problem even if you are not sure which 
option you prefer. Please consider the problems in order and do 
not turn back to previous pages after they have been completed. 
Feel free to take all of the time you need to make your choices 
and to ask the experimenter to clarify anything for you.
SUBJECT #
The following is an example of a problem you might see where
the choice is between two financial losses:
Option A Option B
Lose $500 in 8 months Lose $425 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
In this sample problem you would be choosing between an immediate 
loss of $425 or a loss of $500 in eight months. If it helps, you 
might think of problems that involve losses as credit plan 
options for the payment of debts.
Here is a problem you might see where the choice is between 
two financial gains:
Option A Option B
Gain $425 in 3 months Gain $500 in 6 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
In this sample problem you would be choosing between a gain of 
$425 in three months or a larger gain of $500 in six months. It 
may help to think of problems that involve gains as options in 
returns on an investment.
Please be sure that you know whether you are choosing between 
gains or losses for each problem and how many months it will take 
to gain or lose the money —  This is VERY important!
Your participation in this study is greatly appreciated!
Option A Option B
Gain $100 in 4 months Gain $75 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $400 in 24 months Gain $300 in 12 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $600 in 5 months Lose $800 in 10 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $2 00 in 18 months Lose $150 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $300 in 2 months Lose $400 in 4 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $150 in 5 months Gain $200 in 10 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $7 5 immediately Lose $100 in 24 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $800 in 18 months Gain $600 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
9. Option A Option B
Gain $300 in 5 months Gain $400 in 10 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
10.
11.
12.
Option A Option B
Lose $2 00 in 24 months Lose $150 in 12 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $75 immediately Gain $100 in 10 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $800 in 24 months Gain $600 in 12 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
13. Option A Option B
Lose $75 immediately Lose $100 in 18 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
14.
15.
16.
Option A Option B
Gain $150 immediately Gain $200 in 4 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $8 00 in 4 months Lose $600 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $4 00 in 18 months Lose $300 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
17.
18.
19.
Option A Option B
Lose $150 in 9 months Lose $200 in 18 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $300 immediately Gain $400 in 24 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $800 in 10 months Lose $600 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
20. Option A Option B
Gain $75 in 2 months Gain $100 in 4 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
21. Option A Option B
Gain $600 in 9 months Gain $800 in 18 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
2 2.
23.
24.
Option A Option B
Lose $100 in 24 months Lose $75 in 12 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $2 00 in 10 months Gain $150 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $4 00 in 4 months Lose $3 00 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
25.
26.
27.
Option A Option B
Gain $600 immediately Gain $800 in 24 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $100 in 10 months Gain $75 in 5 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $150 immediately Lose $200 in 24 months
I prefer to lose (circle one)s A B
28. Option A Option B
Gain $400 in 10 months Gain $300 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
29. Option A Option B
Lose $2 00 in 4 months Lose $150 in 2 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
30.
31.
32 .
Option A Option B
Lose $600 in 2 months Lose $800 in 4 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $200 in 4 months Gain $150 in 2 months
I prefer to gain (circle one)s A B
Option A Option B
Lose $100 in 18 months Lose $75 in 9 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
33. Option A Option B
Gain $4 00 in 4 months Gain $3 00 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
34.
35.
Option A Option B
Lose $600 in 12 months Lose $800 in 24 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $150 immediately Lose $200 in 10 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
36. Option A Option B
Gain $7 5 in 9 months Gain $100 in 18 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
37. Option A Option B
Gain $800 in 4 months Gain $600 in 2 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
38.
39.
40.
Option A Option B
Lose $75 immediately Lose $100 in 10 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $4 00 in 2 4 months Lose $3 00 in 12 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $200 in 18 months Gain $150 in 9 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
41. Option A Option B
Gain $600 immediately Gain $800 in 10 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
42.
43.
44.
Option A Option B
Lose $100 in 4 months Lose $75 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $150 in 12 months Gain $200 in 24 months
I prefer to gain (circle one)s A B
Option A Option B
Lose $800 in 18 months Lose $600 in 9 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
45.
46.
47.
Option A Option B
Gain $75 in 12 months Gain $100 in
I prefer to gain (circle one): A
Option A Option B
Lose $300 immediately Lose $400 in
I prefer to lose (circle one): A
Option A Option B
Gain $400 in 18 months Gain $300 in
I prefer to gain (circle one): A
24 months 
B
10 months 
B
9 months 
B
48. Option A Option B
Lose $3 00 in 9 months Lose $400 in 18 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
49. Option A Option B
Gain $100 in 18 months Gain $75 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
50.
51.
52.
Option A Option B
Lose $2 00 in 10 months Lose $150 in 5 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $800 in 24 months Lose $600 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $150 immediately Lose $200 in 4 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
53.
54.
55.
Option A Option B
Lose $300 immediately Lose $400 in 24 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $200 in 18 months Gain $150 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $100 in 10 months Lose $7 5 in 5 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
56. Option A Option B
Gain $600 immediately Gain $800 in 4 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
57.
58.
59.
Option A Option B
Lose $400 in 10 months Lose $300 in 5 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $200 in 24 months Gain $150 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $75 in 2 months Lose $100 in 4 months
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
60. Option A Option B
Gain $800 in 10 months Gain $600 in 5 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
61. Option A Option B
Gain $400 in 18 months Gain $300 immediately
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
62.
63.
64.
Option A Option B
Gain $300 in 2 months Gain $400 in 4 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Lose $800 in 18 months Lose $600 immediately
I prefer to lose (circle one): A B
Option A Option B
Gain $75 immediately Gain $100 in 24 months
I prefer to gain (circle one): A B
For the following problems, select one of the options in each 
pair by clearly circling either the letter A or B.
7. 80% chance to win $4,000 $3,200 for sure
A B
8. 20% chance to win $15,000 $3,000 for sure
A B
9. 90% chance to win $2,000 $1,800 for sure
A B
10. 10% chance to win $16,000 $1,600 for sure
A B
11. 50% chance to win $5,000 $2,500 for sure
Final Questions
Male _____ Female _____
Age _____
Do you have any knowledge of discounting in accounting or 
finance? (If yes, please elaborate.)
Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing 
between gains in this study.
Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing 
between losses in this study.
Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing 
between different delays.
